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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of tariff protection that incorporates
cooperative behavior and interest-group lobbying. Governments are assumed
to use import tariffs or subsidies to maximize a weighted sum of lobbying
contributions and general welfare. It is assumed that governments do not use
export taxes or subsidies and thus balance the interests of export and import
competing lobbies in setting tariff levels. In a symmetric model, governments
interact in a stationary infinitely repeated game in which cooperation is
sustained by threats of punishment in future periods. Unless governments
place too much weight on the future, the result is a cooperative tariff; export
lobbies succeed in lowering but not eliminating protection. If governments
place too much weight on the future, the result is a reciprocal import subsidy.
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I. Introduction
Despite economists long-standing recognitionof the Pareto:..optimality of free· trade ::.: ·
from a global viewpoint, governments continue to intervene in trade on a widespread basis.
This has led to inquiries into the political economy of protection. There is ample
evidence thatinterest groups play an important role in shaping trade policy) The conflict ..
between these groups has been predominantly over the extent of protection from imports;
export subsidies are rare and quantitatively much smaller. 2 While import-competing
producers support protectionist measures, exporting producers oppose them. In the
absence of export subsidies, exporters must rely on reciprocal trade liberalization as a trade
policy instrument. Since the end of World War II, such reciprocal liberalization has taken
place under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a forum for
international cooperation.
This paper presents a model that captures these facets of historical experience.
Earlier research has developed models in which trade policy is the outcome of tradeoffs
between the general welfare interest and lobbying. 3 The most rigorous of these is due to
Grossman and Helpman (1992, 1993) who assume that some subset of the industries in a
country are represented by lobbies. These lobbies submit &contribution schedules~ to the
government describing the contributions the lobby will pay for each potential level of the _
policy variables. There is inherent conflict between agents in the economy: each producer,
as a net seller of his product, benefits from a higher price in his industry but prefers a lower
price for every other good, for which he is a net consumer. Grossman and Helpman (1992)
draw on the &common agency~ analysis of Bernheim and Whinston ( 1986a, 1986b) to

deterrr1ine equilibrium lobbying contributions and government policies.
But the Grossman and Helpman models cannot explain why or to what effect
export interests are pitted against import-competing interests; the two interact only as
consumers of each others products. 4 Nor can they explain why we almost universally

1see Bhagwati (1988) and Krueger (1993).
2This has a basis in Article XVI of the GAIT, which calls for contracting parties to &seek to avoid.1 export
subsidies on primary products and to abolish export subsidies on all other goods. The principal exception to
this prohibition has been in agriculture (Dam, 1970, Chapter 8).
3For a broad survey of the literature concerning the political economy of trade policy, see Hillman(1989).
4One might surmise that general equilibrium considerations cause governments to balance these interests.
That would be one implication ofLemer s Symmetry. Theorem, for example ..[see.Lemer (1936),
McKinnon(1966) and Corden (1984)]. However, this effect does not seem to be the one that motivates
exporters to lobby for trade liberalization [Destler and Odell (1987), Milner (1988)]. Exporters seem more
concerned with the policy of foreign governments than with the general equilibrium repercussions of
domestic trade policy.
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observe outcomes which, on net, aid import-competing producers (and not exporters). 5
This paper shows that in a symmetric version of the Grossman and Helpman model, export . -
subsidies exceed import tariffs in sectors with lobbies. If export subsidies are not used, .
then countries impose reciprocal· import subsidies in the cooperative equilibrium. In the
non-cooperative setting without export subsidies, however, import-competing lobbies win
tariff protection. This suggests that the degree of sustainable cooperation is important ·
Models of cooperation, as discussed in Dixit (1987) and applied in Bagwell and
Staiger (1990, 1993), explain how trade policies can be set cooperatively and sustained
through self-enforcing agreements. However, in such models policy is determined between
unitary governments. They abstract away from the interplay of domestic forces.

In this paper, a model is developed in which governments are assumed to maximize
a function containing lobbying contributions (producers interests) and the general welfare
,(consumers interests) as its arguments in the context of a repeated game. In the absence of
export subsidies, governments set import policies so as to balance the conflicting interests
of exporters and import-competing producers. Governments are constrained to reach
cooperative agreements that are self-enforcing.
It is shown that the effectiveness of the mechanism to enforce international
cooperation plays a vital part in determining the role of lobbying. This is summarized in the
formal model by the government s discount factor. If the discount factor is below a critical
level, protection rises as the weight placed by governments on lobbying contributions
increases. Above that critical level, protection falls as the weight placed on contributions
rises. This is because the absence of export subsidies implies that political forces for trade
liberalization (exporters) can only have an impact when sufficient cooperation between
trading pa..rtners is possible.

In the next section, the Grossman-Helpman structure is reviewed, since it forms the
basis for the later sections. Section III considers the effects of limiting trade policy
instruments and predictions of net trade promotion. Section IV introduces a linear version
ofthe model and discusses the impact of a repeated-game setting. In Section V, a specific
numerical example allows exploration of cases with multiple sectors and permits a
comparison of results across different assumptions. Section VI concludes.
5Toe question of why strong export industries cannot, in fact, fully prevail is closely related to the question
of why Pareto-improving trade liberalization packages cannot garner electoral support. In an approach that
differs from the one in this paper, Krueger (1990) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) argue that uncertainty
over who gains from a trade reform prevents Pareto-improving policies from being adopted, Krueger calls
the tendency to favor known losers over unknown winners an &identity biasA and argues that it favors
established import-competing industries. Fernandez and Rodrik provide a model in which efficiency- ·
enhancing reforms that would be approved in an ex-post ballot would not be approved ex-ante because of the
uncertainty over who will lose.
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II. The Basic Setting
A. Production, consumption and trade.
The setting for the analysis will be a world with two countries. 6 These countries
will be assumed to be identical in their political structures, although they will differ in their ..
autarky relative prices and may differ. in the values of other parameters ..
In each country, a wide range of traded products are produced with constant returns
to scale technology. One of these, good z, is the numeraire good. This good uses only the
mobile factor in production, labor, and units are chosen such that the price of a unit of z
and the wage paid to labor are one. 7
(2.1)
Pz =w = 1
The production processes in sectors 1 through n, however, will use both labor and a factor
that is specific to each sector and in fixed supply. With the assumption that the return to
labor is fixed, the profits of any firm are solely a function of the domestic price, so we may
write IIi = IIi (pi). Hotelling s lemma provides supply as.a function of price:
(2.2)

xi

= rriIP(Pi)

In each country, these goods are consumed by the agents in the economy, of which
there are Lin the home country, L* in the foreign country. These agents derive their
income from the sale of their labor and perhaps share ownership of one of the specific
factors. 8 They also receive a fraction of any net revenue the government earns through
tariffs or export taxes. They consume to maximize identical utility functions of the
following quasi-linear form:
n

(2.3)

U = cz +

Lu;(cxJ
i=l

where cz is consumption of the numeraire good and Cxi denotes consumption of good i.
The subutility functions ui( ) possess the standard properties of differentiability and strict
concavity. This direct utility function leads to demand functions of the form:
(2.4)

ex;

=

d;(P;) = [u;(P;)]- 1

i=l, ,n

The indirect utility function, with income E, is:
(2.5)

v(p,E) = E+[tu;(d;(P;))- tp;d;(P;)]

6This general model (with full use of policy-instruments) is that of Grossman and Helpman (1993), with
only minor modifications. That paper and Grossman and Helpman (1992) provide a fuller description and
development.
7It is assumed thatsome of the numeraire good is produced in each country.
8For simplicity, it will be assumed that agents own shares of at most one of the specific factors.
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The bracketed term is the consumer surplus from goods other than the numeraire good. It
will be useful to define that term as s(p), were p is the entire vector of domestic prices. . ...· ....,...
World prices adjust to clear global markets; Specifically, the world price of goodi,i"·;i
p~ is the price such that domestic net exports of good i equal foreign net imports:

xi(p;)- Ldi(p;)= Ldi*(p;)-xi*(p;)

(2.6)

L*

L

Production and consumption depend on the world price indirectly however. Central to this
paper s discussion will be tariffs and subsidies. These will be denoted by 'ti and 'ti* , where · .
'ti < 1 denotes an import subsidy or an export tax and 'ti > 1 denotes a tariff or an export
subsidy. 9 Thus, domestic prices in the home country in sector i will be:

Pi = ript

(2.7)

Given the trade policy schedules 't and -r*, the elements of pw adjust so as to satisfy
Equation 2.6 and clear world markets.
Given a trade policy vector, we can also determine net domestic government
revenue as:
(2.8)

where dij( ) is the demand of individual j for good i as a function of the domestic price.
Each agent in the domestic economy receives R/L in a transfer from the government. R
could be negative, in which case the government would collect R/L in payments from each
agent. The foreign revenue is defined in parallel fashion and agents in the foreign economy
receive R*/L*.
Next, the welfare of the populace can be defined. Summing Equation (2.5) over all
agents in the economy and substituting the elements of every agent s income, the welfare of
the populace is:
n

(2.9)

w( r,pw) = L+ Lrri( rip;)+ R( r,pw) + s( r,pw)
i=l

This equation combines labor earnings, earnings from shares in profitable industries, net
tariff revenue, and total consumer surplus from non-numeraire goods. W is the function .
that a government would work to maximize if it functioned solely in the public interest.
However, this paper follows Grossman and Helpman (1992, 1993) in assuming that
governments also benefit from political contributions. Only a subset of industries will be .
represented by lobbies and it is these lobbies that will make political contributions to

9Tois is the convention used by Grossman and Helpman (1992, 1993) and is most useful for.discussing
their results. Later, the linear example will use a specific tariff.
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maximize the welfare of those they represent. 10 In fact, behind the industries are
shareholders, whose welfare depends on the profits of the industry in which they hold
stock, on the prices of goods they consume and ontheir contributions. Therefore, a lobbyi
will pressure the government for higher prices for goods produced by the represented
industry (higher 'ti) and lower prices for all other goods (lower 'tj for all j i). Let Li < L be
the number of domestic agents represented by lobby i. We can define <Xi_=(Li / L) as the ,.
fraction of the population represented by lobby i. Further, let
(2.10)
a= I,.a;
be the fraction of the population represented by any lobby, where 0 is the set of all
industries represented by a lobby.

B. The lobbying framework.
Let Wi represent the sum of the welfare of all the shareholders represented by lobby
i. We will assume that lobby i makes contributions to the government to maximize Wi. It
does this by offering the government a contribution schedule, ½('t,'t*), contingent on both
domestic and foreign trade policy. The schedules are shown by Grossman and Helpman in.
equilibrium to be &truthful~ in the following specific sense: 11
(2.11)

cJC; =

aw;

arj

arj

and cJC; =

aw;

ar; ar;

for allj.

Thus, the actual level of the contribution will be:
(2.12)
C;(r,r*)=W;(r,r*)-B;
where Bi is a sector-specific positive constant that emerges from the bidding equilibrium.
These schedules are only observable within a country.
The final element of this frai.Tiework is the government welfare function. It will be
assumed that the domestic government (and foreign government, in parallel fashion)
maximizes a weighted sum of contributions and general welfare:
WG(r,r*)=aW(r,r*)+ I,.c/r,r*)
(2.13)
jE0

through its choice of policy instruments, 't, and through persuasion of the foreign
government to alter -r*, if that is possible. The parameter a indexes the extent to which the
government cares about the welfare of the populace, relative to contributions. By
substituting Equation 2.12 into Equation 2.13, one can see that agents who are represented
10Tue issues of &collective action~ and free ridership in contributing to lobbying efforts will not be

addressed here. This paper takes the existence of contributing lobbies as exogenous.
11 Grossman and Helpman (1992) draw on the work of Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) and show that
rational behavior requires lobbies bids to meet this criterion in the neighborhood of equilibrium &local
truthfulnessa. Both Grossman and Helpman and this paper also assume &global truthfulness~, which can.be. ·
shown to be among a lobby s setof best response strategies to any opponents strategies.
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by lobbies effectively have their welfare assigned a weight ( 1+a), whereas those agents
who are unrepresented receive the weight a.1 2 Previous attempts at modeling political
economy have started from the assumption that the government maximizes such an
unevenly weighted objective function. 13 The merit of the Grossman-Helpman model lies in·
the foundation it provides for this weighting scheme.

C. Large country solutions
With this model, Grossman and Helpman. ( 1993). describe two trade policy
,equilibria. In the first, they restrict contribution schedules to be contingent solely on the
domestic trade policy vector 't and solve for the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The
domestic government chooses 't to maximize w0 , taking 't* as given. Similarly, the foreign
government maximizes WG*, taking 't as given. Each of these operations defines a reaction
function and the solution for a sector i is:
1;0 - a X;
(2.14) 14
a+a P;WM';

+_!_
e;*

where Iie=l if sector i is represented by a lobby and O otherwise; Mi are net imports in
sector i; and ei*= ('t* p~ Mi*') I Mi*, the foreign import demand or export supply
elasticity. Note that Mi', the change in net imports due to an increase in price, will be
negative. Thus, the greater the weight placed on general welfare, a, the lower the
production in sector i, Xi, and the more elastic foreign import demand or export supply, the
lower the equilibrium value of 'ti (i.e., the greater the spur to trade in sector i). Further, the
greater the percentage of consumers represented by lobbies, a, the lower the equilibrium
value of 'ti, to the point where if all consumers are represented and a = 1, then the
. government will impose the classical optimal tariff or export tax.
Next we consider a cooperative equilibrium. Now contributions may be contingent
on both 't and 't*. We assume that transfers between countries are possible and that the
solution maximizes joint welfare: 15
(2.15)
P('t, 't*) = a*WG('t, 't*) + aWG*('t, 't*)
Because world prices, pw, adjust to clear global markets, only the relative levels of 't and 't*
affect production, profits, and consumption in each country. In other words, if the
exporting country imposes a subsidy on its export good and the.importing country.imposes
12There is also the industry-specific constant term, but this falls ·out with differentiation. Therefore, the

weighting described in the text is equivalent.
13 For example, Grossman and Helpman cite Hillman (1982) and Long and Vousden (1991). See also
Krugman (1993).
1411lis is Equation 17 from Grossman and Helpman (1993). The solution for the foreign country is
analogous.
-15Because of the linearity of welfare in this model, the weights in Equation 2.15 are necessary so as to
equalize the welfare value of a.transfer across countries.
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a countervailing tariff, the world price would fall to leave the domestic prices in each
country unchanged. Since production, profits and consumption depend only on these
domestic prices, they too would be unchanged. The absolute levels of '.t and 't* only
deterrilinetariff revenue or subsidy cost and thus the amount of the transfer between
countries. [For this reason, no transfers are actually necessary, since the same end can be
achieved through adjusting the absolute levels of the trade policy instruments]. The
cooperative equilibrium is thus:
(2.16) 16

r.
'

_*-[
r. '

X;*]

1;0 -a X; ]-[ I*;e•-a*
a+a p;M;'
a*+a* p;M;*'

This is very similar to Equation 2.14 with respect to the effects of the different variables on
trade policy. The principal change is that terms of trade effects are omitted, since they are
negative-sum.

Ill. Static Setting
This section will attempt to characterize and interpret these equilibria both as they
are presented above and with a restriction disallowing export subsidies. A first important
aspect to note about the tariff equilibria in the previous section is that they are determined
only by aggregate variables and by the characteristics of the sector in question. If a home
export industry i is large and stands to profit a great deal from a price increase, it lobbies
for an export subsidy or a reduction in the foreign tariff in sector i. In the non-cooperative
case, described by Equation 2.14, it will receive the subsidy if terms-of-trade concerns are
relatively unimportant. In the cooperative case, described by Equation 2.16, the relative
strength of the export industry i at home and the import-competing sector i abroad will

deterrr.dne whether there is net trade promotion-or impedance in sector i (see below for a
symmetric reference case). In neither case does the lobby for industry i press for
liberalization in home sector j in exchange for foreign liberalization. This is because the
government is assumed to have sufficient instruments at its disposal to satisfy each sector
independently of the others.
This section will consider the equilibrium outcomes of the model in a benchmark
symmetric setting in which countries and sectors are identical in all respects except for their
supply schedules. In an export sector, an industry supplies more at a given price than its
foreign counterpart industry. In an import sector, the reverse holds. 17 Of the many sectors
in the economy, weinitially positthat there are two represented sectors, 1 and 2, in each
country. We assume that:
16Tois is Equation 26 from Grossman and Helpman (1993).
17This could be due to differences in technology or in endowments of the sector-specific factor.

8

(3.1)

'if p

so the home country exports good 1 and imports good 2.
There are four variations to consider: Equilibria with oLwithout export subsidies ..
and with or without cooperation.

A. With full instruments
i. Non-cooperative
In this case, the solution is given by Equation2.14. We are.interested onlyinthe .··
net effect of policy interventions on trade in each sector, ('t1 * - 't1) or ('t2 - 't2*). If these
terms are positive, then there is net trade protection. Let us consider good 2, where the
home country is an importer. 18 If we assume that the two countries have equal weights
placed on general welfare, (a=a*); equal percentages of agents represented by lobbies,
(a=a*); and equal import demand or export supply slopes, ( M 1' = M 1 *' ), 19 the difference
in tariffs will be given by:

(3.2)

1
1
-r2 --r2 *= [ -( - 1-a
-) -] (X2 -X2 *)+--WM,
*
a+ a P2 2
ez ez

The bracketed term is positive, since Ota< 1 and M2' < 0.
To interpret this result, we can look at two extremes. First, if we assume for a
moment that there is no lobbying for consumer interests (a z 0) 20 and that a very high
weight is placed on contributions relative to general welfare (=a near zero), then the first
term of Equation 3.2 will dominate the elasticity terms. By assumption, Xi* > X 2 since the
foreign country is the exporter so 't2 - 't2* would be negative. In other words, the export
subsidy in the foreign country on good 2 would exceed the domestic tariff on good 2, so
thP. nf~t P.ffor.t of tr~ilP. 1ntP.rvP.nt1on ~r,ross thP. tum crnmtnPs is tnprnmnte trade.
On the other hand, if we assume that political contributions played a very small role
in government welfare relative to the welfare of the general populace (=a would be very
large), then the first term becomes insignificant and the two elasticity terms predominate.
The first of these terms contains the foreign export supply elasticity, which is positive. The
second contains the domestic import demand elasticity, which is negative. These terms

18Because of symmetry, home country (importer) solutions for good 2 are identical to foreign country
(importer) solutions for good 1. Equally, foreign country (exporter) solutions for good 2 are identical to
home country (exporter) solutions for good 1. Therefore, only good 2 will be discussed.
19Toe changes in net imports with respect to the domestic price need not be equal across countries,
particularly because domestic prices will differ between countries if 't 1, However, the assumption is
plausible and it is easy to see how the equilibrium would change with deviations from this assumption.
These symmetry conditions will be used from this point on in the paper.
20 This would happen if the percentage of all consumers represented by lobbies (through their ownership of . "' .
shares in politically-represented industries) were trivially small.

9

represent the classical terms of trade considerations in tariff setting and each works for net
trade impedance.
Thus, in the symmetric non-cooperative setting with both export and import policies,,·
available to governments, the standard efficiency argument for import tariffs or export taxes .
encourages net trade protection whereas lobbying encourages net trade promotion. Which
effect predominates will depend on the weight the government places·on general welfare.
relative to lobbying contributions, but the fact remains that introducing political economy
considerations promotes rather than restricts trade.
ii. Cooperative
If we apply the same symmetry assumptions to Equation 2.16, the net trade policy

will be:
(3.3)
This solution is identical to that in Equation 3.2, only it is missing the elasticity terms. This
is becausethe costs of tariffs or export taxes imposed to alter the terms-of-trade exceed the
benefits when both countries welfare is taken into account; i.e., the terms-of-trade effects
of trade restrictions are &beggar-thy-neighbor~ policies and cooperation ensures they will
not be used.
As discussed above, the right-hand side of Equation 3.3 is negative as long as

Xi*

> X2 . Thus, in the symmetric cooperative case, lobbying is clearly a force for net trade
promotion. One might still observe a tariff in the home (importing) country; it would just be
exceeded by a foreign export subsidy. Whether a tariff is countered by an export subsidy,
or an import subsidy exceeds an export tax, depends on the absolute levels of 'tz and 'tz*.
These are set so as to effect a transfer between the countries (the higher the level of 't2 and
't2*,

holding their difference constant, the greater the transfer to the importing country). If,

as is assumed here, there are two such sectors so that the transfer in one will exactly offset
the transfer in the other, then the absolute levels will be indeterminate.

B. Limiting export instruments
For reasons given earlier, we now modify the model to assume that governments
cannot apply export taxes or subsidies ('t1 = 't2*= 1). Since the relationship between net
protection·and profits is unchanged for both import-competing and exporting industries, the
lobbying schedules will offer the same contributions per level of net protection. Again, we
examine non-cooperative and .cooperative solutions.
i. Non-cooperative

10

In the non-cooperative setting, neither government can do anything to affect the
profits ( or cohtributions) of their export industries,· since the onlyrelevant policy variable .•·.. ,,, ,,,,,_
for the export industry is the foreign tariff Therefore; each government sets its tariffso as :
to balance general welfare and consumer lobbying againstcontributions from the import- ·
competing sector. The resulting net protection is:

'l'z -1=[ 1-a

(3.4)

;2 ,]+J.

a+ a p 2 M2

e2

where e 2* > 0 since the foreign country is assumedto·export good 2. The right-hand side
is unambiguously positive. Here both the first term, which represents the effects of
lobbying, and the second, which represents the terms-of-trade effects, are positive. This is
the only case of the four permutations in which there is unambiguous net trade protection
and in which political economy serves to heighten levels of protection.
ii. Cooperative - reciprocal import subsidies
Under the cooperative solution without export subsidies, the same net trade
protection is achieved as with export subsidies:

1-a

]

(Xz - Xz
)
'l'z - 1 =[ - (
a+a pwM'
2
2

(3.5)

*)

This is the constrained version of Equation 3.3. The indeterminacy in the absolute levels of
the policy variables is now removed, however, and 't2='t1 *<1 so long as the exporting
country produces more than the importing country for each product. In other words, each
nation applies an import subsidy under full cooperation.
This represents the effect of export-interest lobbying on trade liberalization. In the
cooperative equilibrium, the countries not only remove their tariff barriers but subsidize
imports solely in order to win the same treatment abroad for their represented export
industry. The export interests do not explicitly press for a reduction in their country s
tariffs; their contributions are still contingent on the foreign tariff or subsidy that they face.
However, the only means for achieving a drop in foreign barriers is a reciprocal drop in
domestic barriers. 21
The absence of export subsidies forces each government to weigh the interests of its
represented exporters against those of its represented import-competing industry. Because

21 No variables characterizing the strength of.the home country s export interests appear explicitly in
Equation 3.5 because of the symmetry of the model. In.a sense, they do appear since the foreign export
interests are identical to the domestic export interests. In an asymmetric model, one would need a different
solution concept, such as the Nash Bargaining Solution, in order to determine the allocation ofthe benefits
of cooperation between countries.
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exporters are larger and have more to gain from a price change than import-competing firms
have to lose, they prevail and governments providernciprocal trade·subsidies.

C. Unrepresented sectors
Curiously, if we examine cooperative equilibria in which the domestic and foreign
producers in the sector in question are politically unrepresented (i.e., are unable to lobby);
the results reverse themselves. One can easily derive the following value of the equilibrium
cooperative tariff without export subsidies from Equation 2.16:
(3.6)

'r2

-1=[(

~

a+a p;M2'

](x

2

-X2

*)

The sign is now reversed from Equation 3.5, so the two countries apply a reciprocal
positive tariff. If export policies were permitted, there would be net protection, although the
actual levels of the policies would depend on the transfer between countries:
(3.7)

r-r*2

2

-

a
] ( X-X*
)
[ (a+a)p;M2'
2
2

Thus, symmetrically unrepresented sectors win protection while symmetrically
politically represented sectors do not. 22
The explanation for this paradoxical result is that in both of these cooperative
equilibria, the unrepresented producers are &losing~ to represented interests who gain from
tariff revenue and from lower prices for the country s export good. When both exporting
producers and import-competing producers are represented, the pressure for net trade
promotion by the exporters exceeds the pressures for protection. When neither is
represented, consumer interests in each country prevail and gain lower prices for the export
goods as well as tariff revenue.
Finally, when export taxes and subsidies are available, with the counterpart to
Equation 3.2 one can see that the non-cooperative solution for unrepresented industries will
unambiguously entail net trade protection:
(3.8)

r 2 -r2 *=

1 1
-a) -WM,
-] (x2 -x2 *)+--(
[a+ a P2 2
e2* e2

Each term of the right-hand side is now positive.
Without export taxes or subsidies, the non-cooperative policy on imports will be a
tariff or a subsidy, depending on whether terms-of-trade or political-economy concerns
prevail:

22Toe conditions for this to hold are the same symmetry conditions described earlier. Note also that if no
lobbies pursued their. clients consumer interests, then a = 0 and there is free trade in unrepresented sectors.
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r 2 -1 =

(3.9)

[_.!!_
a+ a

X2 ] + _!_*
WM,

P2

2

e2

The first term is negative (since M2' < 0) and the second term is positive.

D. Restoring net trade protection
It is possible to observe net protection as a result of lobbying in the original
Grossman-Helpman model. It was shown in the symmetric case above that in the non

cooperative equilibria without export instruments, net trade protection would result.
However, since there has clearly been a history of cooperation in lowering international
trade barriers, this is not a wholly satisfactory explanation. There are also two principal
deviations from the symmetric case described above that could lead to positive tariffs.
First, one could relax the assumption that exporters produced more than import
competing producers. If X 2 > X 2 * in Equations 3.2, 3.3 or 3.5, other things equal, then
the effects of lobbying will be reversed. The new assumption, under which exporters
would produce less than import-competing industries, could be justified by an asymmetry
in preferences; each country would need to have a greater demand than the other for its own
import good.
Second, one could introduce other asymmetries into Equations 3.2, 3.3 or 3.5.
These could include a greater emphasis on general welfare in one country (a>a*, e.g.) or
different degrees of political representation (a>a*). These changes would make one
country more likely to impose protection in all sectors, however. To the extent that the
predicted policies for one country became more plausible, the predicted policies for the
other country would become less plausible.

l'-1one of these modifications is pa..-rtJcularly satisfactorf as a general explanation of
protection. While disallowing export subsidies does compel governments to balance export
interests against import-competing interests, the net result is implausible: In symmetric
cooperative settings in which the larger producer exports, political economy emerges as a
force for trade promotion.

IV. Infinitely Repeated Game -

Algebraic Results

The implausible levels of trade promotion that can emerge from the Grossman and
Helpman model represent the extreme of full cooperation. The previous section also
discussed the alternate extreme of no cooperation, which does entail positive tariffs when
export subsidies are disallowed. With a linear version ofthe model in which export taxes
and subsidies are not available, this section will describe the cases in between when only.
limited cooperation is supportable in a repeated game.
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A. Modifications in assumptions
We retain the assumption of two countries with two symmetric represented sectors.
·For tractability, we now assume that the supply function, X(p}, takes one of two linear
forms. For exporters:
(4.1)

For import-competing firms:

X(p)= p-f3H
</>

(4.2)

where p is the price faced by the agent in question, <!>,

PL and PH are positive constants, and

PL< PHThe linear demand functions will be identical across sectors and countries:
(4.3)

D(p)= X-P

r

where X and y are positive constants.
Without loss of generality, we now assume that tariffs or import subsidies are
specific, rather than ad valorem. Therefore p+'t will be the price in the importing country
(provided 'tis non-prohibitive) and pthe price in the exporting country. However, p will be
a function of 't since both countries are large. In equilibrium, the exporting country faces
the market-clearing world price:
P = 2 </>x +
c4 A)

r(/JL + /JH) _ !..
2
2(<1>+r)

while the importing country consumers and producers face price p+'t. We will impose the
restriction on the parameters that both the import-competing industry and the exporting
industry will produce under free trade (see Appendix).
The welfare of the populace, W('t,'t*) is the sum of consumer surplus, producer
surplus (profits), and tariff revenue. The government maximizes a weighted sum of this
and political contributions as in Equation 2.13.

B. Nature of the Game
To ascertain the limits of cooperation, we assume that there is no external
enforcement mechanism, so any cooperative agreement must be self-enforcing. There is a
unique non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in this tariff-setting game. In this non
cooperative equilibrium each country adopts a positive tariff as described by Equation
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3.4. 23 However, if countries engage in repeated play, the possibility arises that some
cooperation can be sustained. The governments wouldwish for an. agreement that went
beyond free trade to reciprocal import .subsidies, as in Equation 35. Whether such an .· ·
agreement would be self-enforcing would depend on the governments discount factors and
punishment strategies. We explore this issue in an infinitely repeated game in which the
threat of punishments in future periods induces countries to adopt cooperative tariff
levels.24
We assume that the setting is stationary. Lobbies base their contribution schedules
on current-period policy variables. The contributions of the export industry are contingent
on the current period foreign tariff while the contributions of the import industry are
contingent on the current period domestic tariff. 25 Neither country can observe the others
contribution schedules.
After lobbies have submitted their contribution schedules each period, governments
determine the tariff levels they will apply. Governments are aware of the stationarity of the
environment in which they operate and are thus able to calculate the discounted present
value of their welfare (contributions and general welfare) under cooperative or non
cooperative play. We restrict our consideration of government strategies here to symmetric
stationary subgame..perfect solutions. We focus in particular on the strategy in which each
country applies a cooperative tariff, 'tc (lower than the Nash non-cooperative tariff, 'tN)
unless either government applies a different tariff, after which point both countries would
apply 'tN for every period thereafter.26
Infinite reversion to 'tN by both players would imply a relative welfare loss in all
future periods. A country would only incur such a loss if it were exceeded by the
irrnnedll'lte gl'liTI frnrn rlefectlng to ik nptirnl'll fariff (-rN) when thP: nthP:r r.rnmtry impm:P:~ thP:

cooperative tariff. So long as the cooperativetariff is different from 'tN, each country could
gain (gross of punishment) from imposing 'tN. Out of the set of cooperative tariffs for
23 A convenient feature of the model is that this tariff is the optimal non-cooperative solution independent
of the other country s actions.
24The difficulty with a finitely repeated game is that cooperation will be untenable in the last period, so
there will be no punishment for deviations in the nexMoslast period and cooperation will be untenable. This
reasoning can be repeated until cooperation is seen to be untenable in the first period. If there were multiple
Nash equilibria (e.g., if autarky were a Nash equilibrium) then cooperation may be sustainable in a finitely
repeated game [see Dixit (1987) and Benoit and Krishna (1985)],.but that is not the case here.
25For simplicity, we set a= a*= 0, so that lobbies do not press for price reductions as consumers. This
means that lobbies can only represent shareholders' business interests and not their consumption interests.
An inspection of Equations 2.14 and 2.16 reveals that this will have little qualitative effect on the outcome
in a symmetric case. Note also that consumerinterests are·still represented in government welfare, they just
receive weight :::a rather than (1 +a).
26Tuere do exist more severe punishment strategies which could support greatercooperation. The effect of
adopting such a strategy in lieu of the strategy in the text would be to allow a lower discount factor for any
given level of cooperation (or greater cooperation for a given discount factor).
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which each country s immediate payoff to imposing 'tN is less than or equal to its loss in all
· , future periods from playing 'tN rather the cooperative tariff; we define -re· as the tariff

> , --··· -·

closest to the jointly optimal level.27
To formalize this, we return to the notation of Section II where WG('t,'t*) represents
the home government s welfare in a period as a function of its own and the foreign tariff. 28
Symmetry implies that the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions for each country will
be identical, so we omit the asterisks. From the definitions above, we derive the following
ordering:
(4.5)

WG('tN,'tc)

> WG(-rc,'tc) > WG('tN,'tN) > WG(-rc,'tN)

for any cooperative tariff 'tc < 'tN,
The one-time gain for a country from defecting and imposing its optimal tariff, 'tN,
is:

(4.6)
Since WG is strictly increasing in the domestic tariff for 't < 'tN, Q increases as 'tc falls.
The payoff to cooperation is WG(-rc,'tc) - WG('tN,'tN) in every ensuing period. Let 8
represent the governments discount factor. 29 Then the benefit of not defecting and
maintaining cooperation in future periods is:
8
co( re)= - - [W0 ( re, re)- W0 ( rN, rN )]
(4.7)

1-8

It can also be shown that ro is increasing as 'tc falls.
Clearly, when -re = 'tN , then ro = n. It will be shown below that if cooperation is
sustainable, there exists a second, lower value of -re for which ro = Q. That value will be
the lowest supportable tariff, 'tc .

C. Solutions

27We will generally assume that the government discount factor is such that there is no slack in the
incentive constraint, in which case 'tC is the lowest supportable tariff.

28This discussion will deal with home country welfare, although it applies equally to the welfare of the
foreign country because of the assumed symmetry.
29We assume Oto< 1. Note that since this is a governments discount factor, it need bear no relation to
any interest rate. To the extent one believes that governments are more concerned with the short run than
· the average economic agent, one would expect oto be lower than the standard discount factor. Dixit (1987,
•p.340)writes: &There is much evidence that governments, especially democratic ones, have very short time
horizons and correspondingly high discount rates ..!\
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Given truthful lobbying and linearity, government welfare takes the form:

wa( r; r*) = (l+a/p+ :-[3H)2 +-a(x-;~ r)2 + ar((x- p- r) - (p+ r-f3H))

c4.8)

r

r
</>
+(l+a)(p*-{3L)2 +a(x-p*)2

</>

2r

2<1>

where pis the.price of the Home import good defined in Equation 4.4, and p* is the price of the Home export good, similarly defined but dependent on 't'*.
Holding the foreign tariff constant, we can solve for the non-cooperative tariff: .

(4.9)

'l'N

=

(f3H - f3L)(a<j>- y + ay) + 2</>(x- {3H) for a E [a, oo)
(</>+r)(3a<j>-y+3ay)
y
r(f3H -f3L)
(</>+r)

for a

E

[O,a]

The first term is the unconstrained value and is decreasing in =a (see Appendix). The
second term is the prohibitive tariff, which we can call 't'N . We define a as the level of
=a such that the first term equals the second. As in Section ID, in a non-cooperative setting
both import-competing interests and standard optimal-tariff motives argue for a positive
tariff.
The fully cooperative tariff is:

rf: = (f3H -f3i)r
y-a(</>+ r)

(4.10)

Fulfillment of the second-order condition ensures that this will be an import subsidy (see
Appendix).
To solve for the lowest supportable tariff, 'tc , we set m('t'c) = Q('t'c). This yields a
quadratic equation in 't'c, for which one of the two solutions is 't'c = 't'N . The other solution
is:30

2
2
4</>f3Hr-4</>xr+ 4</>f3H!::.y- 4</>f3L!::.y + 2f3HY -2f3LY
+4{3H!::.y2 -4{3L!::.y2 + rN(-</>r-2<f>!::.y-y2 -2!::.y2)

(4.11)
'l'c

+a(-2</>f3Hy+ 2</>f3Ly- 2{3Hy2 + 2/3Lr2)
+arN(3</> 2+ 2</> 211-6</>y+ 4<f>y!::. + 3y2 + 2y2t::.)

=--=--------------------=
(</> + r)(3a</> + 2a</>11- y + 3ay-2!::.y + 2a!::.y)

3°For sufficiently low ::a and ~ no cooperation will be supportable and 'tC will be equal to 't'N . See
Section V and Figure 5.3 for a numerical example.
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where

~ = _l_ and
1-6

't'N is substituted for 't'N when a < a . Whether this 't'c = 't'c is a tariff

or subsidy cannot be determined without further assumptions about the-parameters.
However, one can state the following:
Proposition: For any =a, there exists a critical discount factor ~ (a) below which the
cooperative tariff falls with the weight placed on general welfare and above which the
cooperative tariff rises with the weight on general welfare.
Proof: We consider two cases.
Case I: a > a . At ~=0, it can be shown from Equation 4.11 that the cooperative
solution is identical to the non-cooperative solution. From Equation 4.9 , the non
cooperative solution 't'N falls as =a rises over this range of :a . Since 't'c='t'N at ~=0 then
a't'c<O.
aa
Let M(a) denote the lowest value of~ sufficient to support 't'~. From Equation
4.10, 't'~ rises towards 0 as :a rises, so for ~1'} M we have a't'~O. The derivative a't'c is
aa
aa
. a
A
all L.1,
-C'
. . 1or
. positive
f a't'c 1s
.
h d
A
•
•
and the numerator of -a't'c 1s
L.1, t e enommator o m
contmuous
aa
aa
quadratic in~- However, since a't'c changes sign between ~=0 and ~=~f(a), given a
aa
value of =a, there is one and only one~ for which a't'c= 0, and this
aa
Below this

~

, ~O and above
aa

~

, a't'c>O.
aa

~

~

lies in (0, M(a)).

is a function of =a because 't'N is a

function of =a _31
Case II: at. a . In this case 't'N is prohibitive. We limit the range to =a and~
sufficiently large that some cooperation is sustainable (see footnote 48). a't'~is continuous ...
aa
in ~ over this range, the denominator is positive in this range and the numerator is a
quadratic in ~. as in the previous case. At the boundary point of =a and ~ where
cooperation just becomes sustainable, the one-sided derivative a't'c < 0 (since if it were
aa
positive when 't'c= 't'N , it would not be a boundary point). As before, when ~1'} ~f, a't'c >
aa
31 see Section V for a numerical example.
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·
· a smgle
0 . Therefore, there exists

A
L.l

.
. of :a m
. not a fu nctlon
sueh th. at -a-re = O. s·mce 'tN 1s

aa

this range, linearity ensures that the value of Li is independent of :a. Q.E.D.

This proposition is equivalent to saying that for Li< Li , political economy is a force·
for trade protection while above Li it is a force for trade promotion, since :a is an inverse
measure of the importance of lobbying contributions. While Li divides {a, Li} space into
two parts, one cannot say that for a given d, increases in =a uniformly raise or lower
protection (since Li depends on =a).
To understand the result, recall that export interests are &more powerfu!Li than
import-competing interests, but, unlike import-competing interests, they are dependent on
intemationalcooperationto achieve their ends (in the absence of direct export measures). If
the governments put sufficiently low weight on future periods, little cooperation is possible
and the power of export interests is diminished.
These results will be illustrated through a numerical example in the next section.

V. Infinitely Repeated Game Interaction

Numerical Example and Sectoral

To this point, the discussion concerning the repeated game between countries has
considered only the two represented sectors in the two countries and ignored the other
sectors in the economy. This is a legitimate approach in the following three cases:
a) If the other, unrepresented sectors (aside from the numeraire good) produce non-traded
goods;
b) If the other, unrepresented sectors produce traded goods, but no trade between the two
countries in question occurs in these products;
c) If the two countries in question trade the products from the unrepresented sectors, but if
cooperative agreements in those sectors are separable from the cooperative agreement in the
represented sectors.
If these conditions do not apply, then we must consider the interaction of
represented and unrepresented sectors. In the unrepresented sectors, barring any lobbying

on behalf of consumers, the non-cooperative tariff is the standard optimal tariff of the trade
literature. The fully cooperative tariff would be zero. As with the represented sectors, a
cooperative tariff could be ·supported by the threat of permanent reversion to the non
cooperative tariff in case of a defection.
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However, if the three conditions listed above are unmet, then governments can
support more cooperation in one sector by. requiring.less in another. Consider sectors in .
• pairs, since the benefits to cooperation come in an export sector and the costs in an · · ·
importing sector. If we index each pair by i, the new condition for lowest supportable
tariffs is:
(5.1)
This describes the tradeoff between the lowest supportable tariffs across sectoral pairs. All
these cooperative tariffs will be supported by the threat that if a country defects, its trading
partner will revert to non-cooperative tariffs in all sectors.
While the algebra for solving Equation 5.1 in the general case is complex, the
concept is simple and readily illustrated through a numerical example. We assume that
every sector is identical, except for the intercept of the supply curve, which takes the value
~L or ~H, thus determining whether the industry exports or competes against imports.
Table 5.1 gives the values of parameters under which the model was solved.

Table 5.1
Assumed Value

Variable

0.3

<I>

1

'Y

200

X

30

~H

10

~L

We will begin with the case in which there is not any further linkage between
sectors: a single pair of represented sectors, the case described in the previous section. The
world price, which will obtain in the exporting country is:
(5.2)

p=

61.539 -

't

2

To determine tariffs, we need a further assumption about the weight the government places
on general welfare, :a . If we assume a=3 and ~=0.5 (implying a discount factor, o='i' ),
the non-cooperative tariff will be:
'tN = 11.503
(5.3)
This is below the prohibitive tariff of

'tN

=15.385.
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The fully cooperative tariff which maximizes joint welfare will be an import
subsidy:
(5.4)

i=
C

- 6.897

However, the lowest sustainable cooperative tariff will be:
(5.5)

-re=

3.656

Thus, the fully cooperative solution involves a reciprocal import subsidy, whereas
without full cooperation, the effect of export interest lobbying is a significant lowering of
the tariff, but not to the point of a subsidy.
To demonstrate how 'tc depends on the assumed weights on government welfare
and on the discount factor, Figure 5.1 depicts 'tc as a function of :a , holding ~ = 0.5.
Figure 5.2 depicts 'tc as a function of~, holding a=3.

Figure 5.1
14

't
C

12

10

8

6

a
6

8

10

Figure 5.1 depicts the lowest supportable cooperative tariff as a function of the weight the .
government places on general welfare, :a . The graph is based on ~=.5 and the parameters
in Table 5.1. For a<l.96, the non-cooperative tariff solution is the prohibitive tariff.
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Figure 5.2
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Figure 5.2 shows the lowest supportable cooperative tariff as a function of~, a measure of
the weight the government places on welfare in future periods. The graph is based on a=3
and the parameters in Table 5.1. For ~=l.84, the fully cooperative tariff, -6.9, is
supportable. For ~ > 1.84 there is slack in the government s incentive constraint. For ~ =
0, 'tc = 11.503, the non-cooperative level.
Also in the previous section, the solutions were conditional on :a being sufficiently
large. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the extent of this restriction. If at 1.96, then one must
recalculate the cooperative tariff for 'tN = 15.385, the prohibitive level (this is done for
Figure 5.1). For any given a< l.96there exists a ~Osuch that the lowest sustainabie
cooperative tariff will be 't = 15.385 so there can be no trade. This~ falls as =a rises.
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Figure 5.3
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Figure 5.3 shows the ranges of the parameters =a and~ for which comer solutions are a
concern. Between the axes and the lower line, no cooperation is sustainable, so both the
cooperative and non-cooperative tariffs are at the prohibitive level. Between the two lines,
the non-cooperative tariff is prohibitive, but there is trade under cooperation. Above the
upper line, for a>1.96, the non-cooperative tariff is also low enough to allow trade.
For the area in which 'tN is prohibitive, the critical ~ described in the previous
section is:

(5.6)

~

=1.847

When 'tN is not prohibitive (a>l.96),
there is a discontinuity in

~

~

is as portrayed in Figure 5.4. Note that at a=l.96

. The difference between at 1.96 and a> 1.96 is due to the

linearity of the model and the fact that, for lower ::a , changes in ::a have no effect on 'tN
whereas for higher ::a they do.
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Figure 5.4
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a
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0.66

0.64

0.62

Figure 5.4 shows ~ as a function of =a for a>l.96. In this range, the non-cooperative
tariff solution is below the prohibitive level and is influenced by changes in =a. Note that
the vertical axis intercepts the horizontal axis at a=2.
If we now consider an identical pair of sectors which are politically unrepresented,

the free trade price will be the same. The non-cooperative tariff in this unrepresented sector
(with ~=0.5) will be:
5.128

(5.7)

The fully cooperative tariff which maximizes joint welfare will be free trade:
f

(5.8)

'tc = 0

However, the lowest sustainable cooperative tariff will be:
't~ =

(5.9)

2.564

Finally we assume that there are a number ofidentical unrepresented sector pairs
(10) and one represented sector pair. 32 Equation 5.1 implicitly defines a tradeoffbetween
't~ and 'tc. This tradeoff is depicted in Figure 5;5; Given thistradeoff and symmetry, we ·
can depict WG('t~), as is done in Figure 5.6. The new solution that maximizes w 0 (and
therefore WG*) is:

32Toese numbers only affect the magnitude of the tradeoff between supportable tariff levels. The critical
simplifying assumption is that demands and supplies in each of the sectors are identical.
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(5.10)

'tu,

=

2.621

(5.11)

'tc'=

3.453

C

and

Figure 5.5
7

't
C

Figure 5.5 depicts the tradeoff between tariffs in represented and unrepresented sectoral
pairs implicitly defined by Equation 5 .1. The case shown assumes one represented and 10
unrepresented sectoral pairs.
In this case, when there is a linkage between sectors, the governments will choose
to raise the tariff slightly in the ten unrepresented import-competing sectors in order to
allow a lower tariff in the pair of represented sectors.
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Figure 5.6
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Figure 5.6 shows government welfare as a function of the tariff in an unrepresented
import-competing sector, given the constraint depicted in Figure 5.5.

VI. Conclusion
This paper has provided a model in which export lobbies succeed in reducing tariffs
to low but positive levels. Central to the result was the assumption that governments are not
as free to subsidize exports as they are to tax or subsidize imports. It was this· assumption
.. which pitted the export lobbies against lobbies for import-competing industries. Although
the export lobbies are &strongerL1 than the import-competing lobbies which oppose them,
this advantage is offset somewhat by the necessity for governments to cooperate to satisfy
their export lobbies. Particularly if governments have short time horizons, this limits the
tariff liberalization that can be sustained.
Dam (1970, p. 132) asks whether the antipathy toward export subsidies in the
GATT is justified. He discusses several distortions an export subsidy mightremedy. The
results of this paper suggest another justification: The absence of export subsidies
harnesses the lobbying efforts of export-oriented industries toward trade liberalization.
There are several extensions of this work that suggest themselves immediately.
First, it would be useful to examine asymmetric cases to understand what effects country
size might have on liberalization results. Second, a richer dynamic model would allow for
the possibility that profits in one period are not independent of profits in a previous period.
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Finally, this paper may allow a better understanding of the effects of such policy
experiments as the pursuit of free trade agreements. To understand how a free trade
· agreement or customs union might affect a nations trade relations with the outside world, it--•· is first necessary to understand on what basis those trade relations were originally formed.
It is to be hoped that this paper is useful in that regard.
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